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Understanding Democracy and Development Traps
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Shyam Ranganathan,1,* Stamatios C. Nicolis,1 Viktoria Spaiser,1 and David J.T. Sumpter1
Abstract
Methods from machine learning and data science are becoming increasingly important in the social sciences,
providing powerful new ways of identifying statistical relationships in large data sets. However, these relation-
ships do not necessarily offer an understanding of the processes underlying the data. To address this problem,
we have developed a method for ﬁtting nonlinear dynamical systems models to data related to social change.
Here, we use this method to investigate how countries become trapped at low levels of socioeconomic devel-
opment. We identify two types of traps. The ﬁrst is a democracy trap, where countries with low levels of eco-
nomic growth and/or citizen education fail to develop democracy. The second trap is in terms of cultural
values, where countries with low levels of democracy and/or life expectancy fail to develop emancipative values.
We show that many key developing countries, including India and Egypt, lie near the border of these develop-
ment traps, and we investigate the time taken for these nations to transition toward higher democracy and so-
cioeconomic well-being.
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Introduction
As more data becomes available, we increase our un-
derstanding of processes and dynamics we observe in
societies. One phenomenon that has received some
attention in the economics and political science re-
search is development traps. Under certain conditions
countries can get stuck in these traps and experience
a period of stagnation of the socioeconomic develop-
ment on a low level. Data provided by the World
Bank or the United Nations (UN) may give some in-
sight into this phenomena. Data mining and machine
learning techniques,1,2 for instance, could facilitate pre-
dictions about the risk of countries getting trapped in
low development, and the time required for countries
to move out of development traps. This can be a useful
approach if predictions are the ultimate goal. However,
such an approach is limited in terms of providing
understanding2–6 of the dynamics and mechanisms of
development traps.
Data scientists are now discussing ways to extend or
ﬁnd new methods in machine learning that would
allow modeling of causality, detecting mechanisms
or including social and economic theory in data sci-
ence approaches.7–9 In an earlier article,10 we propose
a data-driven dynamical systems approach to deriving
differential equation models from panel data. Our ap-
proach is inspired by machine learning approaches,
to the extent that model building is data driven. How-
ever, our approach differs from a pure machine learn-
ing approach, in that we do not merely ﬁt models
to make best possible predictions but derive a set of
equations that describe the underlying processes. The
hope is that these equations will aid understanding
of the underlying process.
One question where understanding is just as important
as prediction is in the change of cultural values, develop-
ment, and democracy.11–14 In Spaiser et al.15 we applied
our method to look at how democracy, socioeconomic
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development, and cultural values have changed across
different countries in the last 30 years. We ﬁtted differ-
ential equations for the rate of change of six indicators
as a function of the level of the indicator itself and the
level(s) of other predictors in the previous year. The re-
sult of this work was a general dynamical model of the
interactions between democracy, cultural values, and
socioeconomic indicators that provided the best ﬁt to
the available data. Figure 1 summarizes the dynamic
relations we found between the various indicators.15
In brief, we found that a critical level of the Human
Development Index (HDI) triggers democratization
and then the emancipation of the population. However,
while emancipative values contribute to equal access to
education and a healthy life, they do not lead to further
accumulation of wealth. Thus once countries reach high
levels of democracy and emancipation, they tend toward
equilibrium in terms of economic growth.
The next step, and the question we address here, is to
use our model to understand the underlying process of
human development. This is an essential step if we are
to address the issue of mechanisms and causality.7–9
It is also essential if we are to disentangle the conse-
quences of the interactions between values, democracy,
and development shown in Figure 1. While this ﬂow di-
agram indicates positive and negative feedbacks, the
picture becomes complicated when we consider the un-
derlying nonlinear differential equations (presented in
detail below). From these we can see various threshold
effects, where interactions change sign depending on
the level of interacting variables. In particular, these
thresholds suggest the possibility of ‘‘development
traps,’’ where countries can become ‘‘trapped’’ with
low levels of democracy and/or socioeconomic devel-
opment. The question is how these traps interact to de-
termine the course of socioeconomic and political
development in the world.
Development traps are widely discussed in the econom-
ics literature. For instance, Nelson16 and Azariadis and
Drazen17 examined causes such as endogenous population
growth or technological externalities with a ‘‘threshold’’
property, for persistently low rates of growth or relatively
low levels of economic development of countries. More re-
cently, Sachs18 analyzed causes for poverty traps in terms
of misbalances in different types of capital, for instance,
undersupply of human capital in terms of education.19
A poverty trap is generally seen as a self-reinforcingmech-
anism that causes poverty to persist, usually from genera-
tion to generation.20 Low growth and poverty traps are
closely linked, since they represent different perspectives
on underdevelopment.16,21
Rather than concentrating solely on economic growth
traps, we look at development traps with respect to
both democratization and socioeconomic develop-
ment. Our starting point is the empirical relation-
ships summarized in Figure 1, and our aim is to
clarify the implications of these relationships in terms
of development traps. To do this we employ two
tools. The ﬁrst is dynamical systems style22 mathemat-
ical analysis of the nonlinear equations that best ﬁt the
data. The second is stochastic simulation of the equa-
tions. We model inherent variability in development
using independent Gaussian noise variables and ac-
count for the unpredictability by performing stochastic
integrations to obtain estimates of future probability
distributions in the socioeconomic, political, and cul-
tural values indicators.
Data and Methods
We used six different indicators in our analysis: four
socioeconomic indicators and one democracy and
one cultural values indicator. The analysis has been
done for the time period 1981–2006 for 65 countries
(for details on data availability, see Table 1 and Spaiser
et al.15). HDI, H, is our main socioeconomic indicator.
HDI is a composite index, consisting of measures for
education (composite measure of average years of
schooling and expected years of schooling) I, life expec-
tancy (in years) L, and gross national income (GNI) per
capita (in $) G23,24 As in our earlier article, we perform
analysis with HDI and additionally with the single HDI
components.
In our article, D represents human-rights democra-
cy; that is, the democracy index consists of indicators
FIG. 1. Dynamic model of interactions between
socioeconomic indicators, democracy, and
cultural values.
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measuring civil liberties and political rights provided
by Freedom House25,26 and of human right indices
provided by the Human Rights Data Project.27 Finally,
cultural values refer to the World Values Survey28
emancipative values index E, which measures prefer-
ences for ‘‘decision making freedom of the individual
human being and the equality of all human beings in
this decision-making freedom’’29 on the aggregate level.
These six indicators were chosen because the analy-
ses in this article build on results we have published in
an earlier article.15 Originally, the selection of these in-
dicators was inspired by the Human Development
Sequence Theory11,12 that assumes that socioeconomic
development, cultural change, and democracy are
interrelated. We have tested alternative indicators for
democracy (effective democracy), cultural change (self-
expressive values), and socioeconomic development
(GDP per capita, female education) in our two earlier
article, and the six indicators that were selected for an-
alyses in this article proved to be best predictors. The
results are also consistent over different indicators,
with some exceptions for the democracy indicators,
which we have discussed in the previous article.15
The variables H, D, I, and E were scaled from the
original data to be values between 0 and 1. The other
two variables G and L were rescaled to values between
0 and 1. L is restricted to be positive and scaled such
that a value of 1 corresponds to actual life expectancy
of 100 years. Realistic values of L are between 0.3 and
0.9. For G we ﬁrst computed the logarithm of a coun-
try’s per capita GNI, which results in a G range between
5 and 12. In the second step we rescaleG by dividing the
logarithmic values in the data by the maximum 12. As a
result G ranges between 0.46 and 1, which corresponds
to around $260 and $160,000, respectively (for more de-
tails on scaling and data generally, see Spaiser et al.15).
In our previous article, we already identiﬁed rela-
tionships between the ﬁve variables. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁt the changes (dG, dl, dL, dD, and dE) as differential
equations with polynomial terms of the indicator vari-
ables themselves, that is, G, I, L, D, and E. For the ﬁve
variables, these were
dG
dt
= 0:002
G(t)
E(t)
(1)
dl
dt
= 0:007 (2)
dL
dt
= 0:028E(t)(1 0:887
L(t)
)þ 0:004
L(t)
(3)
dD
dt
= 0:11D(t)(G(t)I(t) 1:08D(t))þ 0:025G(t)2 (4)
dE
dt
= 0:028D(t)(L(t) 0:585) (5)
The methodology used in the model selection is de-
scribed in detail in Ranganathan et al.10 and the steps
taken to obtain these speciﬁc models are described in
Spaiser et al.15
In this article, we ﬁrst use phase portraits based on
the equations above to identify different patterns of be-
havior such as trap regions where the yearly changes
slow down to very small values. Second, we look at sto-
chastic integrations of the model.
In order to incorporate stochastic dynamics, we use
discrete time versions of equations and include a
noise term estimated from the data. For a simpliﬁed
two-variable model, these are Equations (6) and (7)
below, while for the ﬁve-variable model these are Equa-
tions (11)–(15) below. The deterministic terms in these
models are precisely the same as described above, al-
though now expressed in discrete time. The noise term
in each variable at each time step is a constant multiplied
by an independent normally distributed random vari-
able with mean zero and standard deviation 1. The
Table 1. Six Development Indicators We Use in Our Analysis and Other Details About the Data
Indicator Range Components Source Years Countries
Human-rights democracy 0–1 Political rights score, civil liberties score,
human-rights performance scores
Freedom House, Cingranelli & Richards
Human Rights Data Project (CIRI)
1980–2006 187
Emancipative values 0–1 — World Value Survey (www.wvsevsbd.com) 1981–2011 65
Human Development
Index
0–1 UN education index, life expectancy,
GNI per capita
UNDP (http://data.un.org) 1980–2012 193
log GNI per capita 5–12 — World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org) 1980–2012 213
United Nation education
index
0–1 Means years of schooling, expected
years of schooling
UNDP (http://data.un.org) 1980–2012 193
Life expectancy 42–83 — World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org) 1960–2012 213
GNI, gross national income.
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noise constant is the standard deviation of the error in
the model ﬁt, that is, the square root of the residual
sum of squares divided by number of observations.
The stochastic integrations were performed starting
from a set of four different initial conditions in the
ﬁve variables corresponding to values for Egypt,
India, Jordan, and Ukraine in 2006. At each time step
we predict the yearly change using the model and
add this to the current levels in the indicator variables
along with independently generated observations from
Gaussian noise variables corresponding to the descrip-
tion above. Since H, D, I, and E only take values from 0
to 1, we force the boundary conditions so that any value
over 1 is taken to be 1 and any value below 0 is taken to
be 0. The lower boundary condition also applies to the
variable L and we assume that it applies also to G, effec-
tively imposing a minimum GNI per capita of 1 dollar.
Results
Democracy and development
Before we deal with the full model from Figure 1, we
start by analyzing the interactions of just two indica-
tor variables: human-rights democracy and HDI. This
analysis will pave the way for the more complex
model established between the ﬁve indicator variables
in the full model. The best ﬁt model relating democracy
and HDI is
Dtþ 1Dt = 0:0709 H2t  0:0658 Dtþ 0:08 D (6)
Htþ 1Ht = 0:0045þ 0:004 H (7)
The noise terms eD (t) and eH (t) are independent
normally distributed random variables with mean 0
and standard deviation 1 and scaled by the estimated
error standard deviation. All parameters are estimated
from the data as described in the Data and Methods
section.
The model of HDI is straightforward to interpret.
HDI grows at a constant rate, plus or minus a random
term, and is unaffected by democracy. The democracy
equation is more complicated. Democracy only in-
creases in countries where
H > 0:96
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
D
p
(8)
For smaller values of H, D decreases and we say that
a country with these values is caught in a democracy
trap. Until socioeconomic development reaches a sufﬁ-
cient level, democracy does not tend to develop in
countries below this threshold.
The democracy trap condition [Eq. (6)] is quantitative,
since it is estimated directly from the available data. It
does not imply that every country below the line fails to
increase in terms of democracy. Rather, it reﬂects the
fact that over the last 30 years those countries that have
not fulﬁlled the HDI condition have generally experi-
enced decreases in democracy, while those above it have
experienced increases. We can, and later in this article
do, speculate why such a trap exists, but for now we sim-
ply note that it is an empirical pattern in the available data
that can be summarized in terms of a single equation.
For this two-variable model, we can go on to obtain a
full solution to the equations, in the absence of noise.
Equation (7) can be solved directly to give
Ht = 0:0045tþH0 (9)
where H0 is the initial level of HDI. Replacing Equa-
tion (9) into Equation (6) and solving the continuous
time version of the equation we get (10).
Dt = 1:08 H20  0:15H0þ 0:01(1þH0t)
 6:63 · 10 4tþ 2:18 · 10 5 t2
þ exp ( 0:066t) (D0 1:08 H20 þ 0:15H0 0:01)
(10)
where D0 is the initial level of democracy. Equation
(10) allows us to determine the time needed for the sys-
tem to reach a particular value of D given a particular
initial condition, H0 and D0.
Figure 2a provides a full-phase portrait of Equa-
tions (6) and (7) (in the absence of noise). There are
two time scales involved in the evolution of H, and
Dt. First the trajectories evolve rapidly toward a slow
manifold, deﬁned by the democracy trap condition
H = 0:96
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
D
p
. Then on the slower time scale, democracy
and HDI evolve upward along this manifold. Figure 2b
gives the time needed for a country to increase its de-
mocracy index by 20% as a function of initial conditions
H0 and D0.
To provide a speciﬁc example, we take initial condi-
tions corresponding to India in 1990, the ﬁrst year the
data is available (H0 = 0.404, D0= 0.281 in 1990). We
can ask how many years it will take for this country
to double its democracy index and reach D = 0.6. Solv-
ing numerically for t, we obtain t& 90 years. The
model thus predicts that given its democracy level in
1990, India is expected to reach a level of 0.6 in 2080,
which is close to that of Argentina in 2006. At the
same time, the HDI will also double and reachH = 0.81.
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The prediction that Indian democracy will grow
slowly does not take in to account intrinsic and external
noise or variability in the process of democratization
and socioeconomic development. Noise and uncer-
tainty is of course inherent in this process. While it is
impossible to account completely for the uncertainty
in future events, we can use the error in our model ﬁt
to account for some of this variability. Figure 3 shows
example evolutions of a stochastic integration of Equa-
tions (6) and (7), including the noise term, for four dif-
ferent initial conditions corresponding respectively to
Egypt, India, Jordan, and Ukraine.
Figure 4 shows a range of different possible democ-
racy outcomes for India over a 50-year time scale, from
long periods with continued low levels of democracy to
increases to levels comparable with United States in
2006. For Ukraine, and also Egypt and Jordan, democ-
racy levels comparable with countries in Western
Europe, that is, greater than about 0.8, are plausible
outcomes within 50 years. These are seen as the darker
band at the top of Figure 4. In general, the noise in de-
mocracy is large, making it difﬁcult to make reliable
predictions using the two-variable model.
Including HDI components and cultural values
The full model includes ﬁve variables. HDI is replaced
by its three compound variables: GNI per capita Gt,
education It, and life expectancy Lt. We also add eman-
cipative values, Et, as measured by the World Values
Survey. The best-ﬁt ﬁve-variable model is given by
Gtþ 1Gt = 0:002Gt
Et
þ 0:0042eG(t) (11)
Itþ 1 It = 0:007þ 0:0053eI(t) (12)
Ltþ 1 Lt = 0:028Et(1 0:887
Lt
)þ 0:004
Lt
þ 0:0033eL(t)
(13)
Dtþ 1Dt = 0:11Dt(GtIt  1:08Dt)þ 0:025G2t þ 0:083eD(t)
(14)
Etþ 1Et = 0:028Dt(Lt  0:585)þ 0:0062eE(t) (15)
where eG (t), etc., are Gaussian random variables with
0 mean and variance 1. All parameters including the
noise constants are estimated from the data as de-
scribed in the Data and Methods section.
There are several insights that can be gained directly
from these equations. First, the values for all the com-
ponents of HDI generally increase over time or reach a
stable equilibrium. In the case of life expectancy, this
equilibrium is around 90 years old. Two of the HDI
components, GNI and life expectancy, interact with
FIG. 2. (a) Phase plane for the explicit solution of the two-variable model. The arrows represent the
direction of the yearly change in the two variables, while the magnitude of change is shown by the color
in the heatmap. Some sample trajectories are also shown with points 5 years apart depicted by blue and
orange circles to show the expected change in the variables over a 5-year period starting from different
initial conditions. (b) Heatmap showing time required to increase the democracy index by 20% as a function
of initial conditions H0 and D0 [numerical solution of t vs. Dt of (10)].
26 RANGANATHAN ET AL.
emancipative values. This interaction is different for
GNI, where countries with high emancipative values
experience slow economic growth, than for life expec-
tancy, which increases with emancipative values.
Democracy and emancipative values both have
potential development traps. In the case of emanci-
pative values, E increases only if L ‡ 0.585; that is,
life expectancy is greater than 58.5 years. Figure 5
shows how L and E interact. The point (L*, E*) =
(0.585, 0.473) is a steady state for this pair of equa-
tions in the absence of noise. Near to the solution
of Lt + 1 = Lt, that is,
E =
1
7(0:887 L) (16)
the change in both Et and Lt is small. It is here we can
think of emancipative values being caught in a trap, al-
though a temporary one. The scatterplot of data shows
that in recent history most countries are moving away
from the right edge of the ‘‘trap’’ region. The excep-
tions to this rule tend to have decreasing emancipative
values. India and Ukraine are both in a region where
change is slow. Eventually, countries will move away
from this region, but this development happens slowly
(velocity of change is color in Fig. 5). In the case of
South Africa, we would predict a decrease in emanci-
pated values before an increase is seen again.
To calculate the time it takes countries to increase
their indicator values by a certain amount, we can do
a further analysis of the system of equations. The steady
state (L*, E*) = (0.585, 0.473) is a saddle node, since one
eigenvalue of the Jacobian is positive and given by
0.028D and the other eigenvalue is given by 0.0145.
Countries to the right of the characteristic curves
(which show Lt + 1 = Lt and Et + 1 = Et) in Figure 5 con-
tinuously increase in both L and E.
Using the eigenvalues we can infer the time needed
to increase the values of E and D. The positive
FIG. 3. Stochastic integrations over a period of 50 years for initial conditions corresponding to Egypt,
India, Jordan, and Ukraine. Average over 10,000 realizations (in black) and 5 different unique realizations
(in color). Noise variances at each time step (corresponding to each year) are based on modeling error as
speciﬁed in Equations (6) and (7).
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eigenvalue 0.028D is the rate at which countries near to
the steady state (L*, E*)= (0.585, 0.473) move away
from it. Thus, countries with high values of democracy
D move faster out of the trap region than countries
with small D. Stochastic simulations of the model for
Egypt, India, Jordan, and Ukraine show how these
countries accelerate out of the trap (Fig. 6). Increases
in emancipative values are slow over the ﬁrst 20
years, especially in India and Ukraine, which are
close to the trap region, but then accelerate. The varia-
tion between simulations is relatively small and these
predictions are stable in the presence of noise.
The dynamic for democracy is similar to the two-
variable model in the previous section, but now with
an interaction between GNI and education. Speciﬁ-
cally, D increases when
D < G(I þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
I2þ 0:98
p
)=2:16 (17)
Democracy requires both high levels of educa-
tion and economic growth in order to increase. Since
education and GNI tend to be correlated, the ﬁve-
variable model makes similar predictions as the two-
variable model. The main difference appears to be in
the speed with which democracy increases. Figure 7
shows how democracy is predicted to change in our
four example countries. Here we see India reaching
higher levels of democracy faster than in the two-variable
model. Again, the variation in the prediction for demo-
cracy is high, and it is plausible that India reaches full
democracy within 50 years.
Figure 8 shows a phase plane for democracy and
GNI for two different cases: one in which education
is relatively low I = 0.42 (Fig. 8a) and the other for
high education I = 0.77 (Fig. 8b). The condition for in-
creases in democracy, given by Equation (17), depends
on I. Lower levels of education shift the condition for
FIG. 4. Heatmaps showing the evolution of the distribution of D values in a set of 10,000 stochastic
simulations of the model for Egypt, India, Jordan, and Ukraine starting from 2006. Noise variance at each
time step (corresponding to each year) based on modeling error.
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increasing democracy downward. By classifying the
countries into those with education below the mean
(Fig. 8a) and above the mean (Fig. 8b), we can see
whether we predict an increase or decrease in democ-
racy. India, Ukraine, Jordan, and Egypt all lie in an
area where democracy is predicted to increase relatively
rapidly in the near future. This observation is consis-
tent with the simulations in Figure 7. These countries
are on their way out of the trapped region and should
move toward greater democracy in the future.
On the other hand, certain countries with excep-
tional levels of democracy are predicted to experience
decreases. For instance, Mali and Ghana have excep-
tionally high levels of democracy given their levels of
GNI. The suggestion here is that these countries
would require extra support, in order to avoid the
fate of those countries in the past (like Nigeria or Ban-
gladesh, for instance), which experienced a decrease
in democracy. Since the time the data was collected
in 2006, Mali has followed the path suggested by
the model, experiencing civil unrest and decreases in
democracy.
Finally, we can calculate the rate at which points
near the line given by Equation (17) move away from
it, using the eigenvalue for these points. This eigenvalue
is 0.002/E. Thus, a higher value of E actually results in
slower movement through the ‘‘trap’’ region. This is be-
cause E slows down growth in G.
Conclusions
In this article, we have extended the theoretical and
empirical concept of the development trap studied in
economics3,17,18 to the political dimension in terms of
political regime development (democratization) and
FIG. 5. The phase portrait of L and E. The arrows show the direction of yearly change in the (L,E) vector and
the color shows the magnitude of change (assuming Dt = 1). The black curve corresponds to the solutions of
Lt + 1 = Lt (assuming noise is zero), while the straight vertical line corresponds to Et + 1= Et. The steady state at
(L,E) = (0.585, 0.473) is a saddle node. The scatterplot points show data for all countries in the dataset in the year
2006. The four sample countries, Egypt, India, Jordan, and Ukraine, are highlighted. Additionally, South Africa,
which appears to be an outlier, is highlighted.
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political culture development (emancipation). In line
with more recent research,30–33 our analysis suggests
that the development trap is a multidimensional phe-
nomenon, because the economic and political spheres
are closely linked and a development trap in the eco-
nomic sphere necessarily translates into a development
trap in the political sphere. Our contribution to this re-
search ﬁeld is the attempt to use the available data to
quantify the development trap and factors causing it
as well as factors contributing to overcome it. More-
over, we use the data to make probabilistic predic-
tions about the time that would be necessary for a
given country to overcome a certain development trap
given its initial situation.
In this regard, we show how data-driven modeling
and analysis can go beyond ‘‘black box’’ analysis and pre-
dictions.3,6 The analysis we do here reveals how different
indicators interact and the implications of these interac-
tions. This provides a step toward a method for elucidat-
ing theories about development directly from data.
It is widely recognized that the last 30 years have
seen a global trend toward democratization, in terms
of regime change and emancipation, where people be-
come more tolerant of the rights of others.12,13,34–36
Despite this general trend, this article has shown that
some countries may not experience democratization
in the near future. They are caught in a development
trap with respect to democracy and/or emancipation.
Although in the long run (50–100 years) we expect to
see democratic and emancipation changes in these
countries too, in the near future these changes will
happen only very slowly, with possible setbacks
due to noisy ﬂuctuations that are caused by various
uncertainties.
FIG. 6. Heatmaps showing the evolution of the distribution of E values in a set of 10,000 stochastic
simulations of the model for Egypt, India, Jordan, and Ukraine. The starting time of the simulation for each
country is 2006.
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FIG. 7. Heatmaps showing the time evolution of the distribution of the values of democracy Dt for Egypt,
India, Jordan, and Ukraine starting from 2006.
a b
FIG. 8. The phase portrait of the G and D subsystem with a scatter plot of the gross national income (GNI) per
capita and democracy values for all countries in 2006 in the available dataset. The arrows show the direction
of yearly change in the (G,D) vector and the color shows the magnitude of change assuming Et = 0.473 the ﬁxed
point for Et. In (a) we show countries whose education indicator values I are below the global average
of 0.621 and in (b) we show countries with I above 0.621. The phase portrait shows the estimated velocities
in any year. The black lines show the characteristic curves for D given by (17) with points above the curve
corresponding to negative change in D values and points below corresponding to positive changes, and these
are computed by taking the average values of I for the countries in (a) and (b), respectively.
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Our analysis shows that countries are caught in a de-
mocracy trap if they have low levels of GNI and/or ed-
ucation. We quantiﬁed the democracy trap condition,
Equation (17), and visualized the rate of change as a
phase portrait (Fig. 8). Countries near the trap con-
dition experience slow increases, or even decreases, in
democracy. It is difﬁcult to say for sure what will hap-
pen in a particular country, but the phase portrait,
combined with the stochastic simulations, shows
that these traps are a real possibility. For example,
simulations for Egypt showed that full democracy is a
possibility within the next 20 years, but so too is a
long period of autocracy (low levels of democracy
indicator).
We also found evidence for emancipation traps.
Emancipation may be seen as the cultural representa-
tion of democratization.12,34,37 The data suggests that
emancipation can only increase if life expectancy is
above a certain threshold. As emancipation depends
on both life expectancy and democracy, higher values
of democracy contribute to a country’s faster move
through the trap region. This is an example of how
being caught in one trap, that is, lack of democracy,
can lead to a country being caught in another, that is,
lack of emancipation.
Indicators can interact in other ways too. For exam-
ple, an interesting result is that high levels of emancipa-
tion, prior to democratization, may actually slow down
movement out of the trap region for democracy. This is
because high emancipative values tend to slow down
economic growth. However, since high levels of de-
mocracy are required for emancipation to grow, this
may not prove possible in practice.
Given these dynamics and accounting for uncertainty
in future events, we made probabilistic predictions
about future democracy trajectories of four exemplary
countries: Egypt, Jordan, India, and Ukraine. The
ﬁve-variable model gives relatively ‘‘optimistic’’ pre-
dictions for all four countries in terms of democratiza-
tion. The predictions generally suggest that all four
countries are likely to become largely democratic within
the next 50 years, but the trajectories are likely to be
characterized by temporary setbacks. At certain points
the changes may be extremely slow and give the im-
pression that the country is stuck.
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